Malik Bennabi on Democracy in Islam, as quoted from Azzam Tamimi
'Democracy', he said, `ought to be looked at from three angles: democracy as a sentiment toward the ego, democracy as a sentiment toward the other, and democracy as the combination of the socio-political conditions necessary for the formation and development of such sentiments in the individual.' He went on to say: `Contrary to the depiction of the romantic philosophy of the era of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, these conditions are not created by nature, nor are they the requisites of natural law, but are the upshot of a specific culture, the crowning of the progress of the humanities and a new appraisal of the value of man; his appraisal of himself and his appraisal of others. Thus, the democratic sentiment is the product of this progress over the centuries and of this twin appreciation of the value of man.'
Citing the French historian Guizot, in his book Europe from the End of the Roman Empire to the French Revolution, Bennabi stressed that various stages of progress led to the emergence of democracy in Europe and to the growth of the democratic sentiment in the European countries. He said: `The great historian explains to us how remote and simple the origins of Western democracy had been before the democratic sentiment slowly formed prior to bursting with the declaration of human rights and citizen rights; the declaration which expressed the new appraisal of man and the legendary and political crowning of the French Revolution. Thus, the European democratic sentiment began to express itself - though not yet ridden of the obscurity that accompanies an object while in the state of making or evolving - through the two grand historical movements, the movement of reform and the movement of renaissance.' Bennabi considers the two movements to be the first expression of the value of the European human in the domain of the soul and in the domain of the mind. He stresses that this is the essence of the Western democratic sentiment when ridden of the fetters of history and politics - since the obscurity is caused by a package composed of phenomena and characteristics peculiar to Western history and which are not found in the history of other races and peoples - and when things are expressed in the terms of psychology and sociology. In other words, the democratic sentiment in Europe was, according to Bennabi, the product and natural outcome of the reform and renaissance movements. `This', he stresses, `is its correct historical meaning, and therefore it cannot simply be severed from the history of Europe so as to be applied to other nations.' However, he reiterates that whether in Europe or anywhere else, the general rule with regard to the nature of the democratic sentiment is that it is the outcome of a specific social continuity. `In psychological terms', he adds, `it is the middle position between two ends that are opposed to each other; the end that expresses the psyche of the oppressed slave on the one hand and the end that expresses the psyche of the oppressive master on the other. The free man, or the new man, in whom the values and conditions of democracy are embodied is the positive co-ordinate that is the sum of two negatives that individually negate all such values and conditions: the negative of servitude and the negative of enslavement.'
As for the question of the existence of democracy within Islam, Bennabi argues that this is dependent on the provision of what he earlier refers to as the general conditions of the democratic sentiment. He then puts forward a set of questions: Does Islam provide and guarantee these objective and subjective conditions, in the sense that it creates a sentiment toward the `ego' and toward the `other' that is compatible with the democratic sentiment? And does it create the appropriate social circumstances for the development of such a sentiment? Does Islam truly reduce the quantity and intensity of the negative motives and of the anti-democratic tendencies that characterize the conduct of the oppressed and the conduct of the oppressor? He suggests that any project aimed at founding a democracy should be considered an educational enterprise for the whole community, administered through the implementation of a comprehensive curriculum that encompasses psychological, ethical, social and political aspects. `Democracy', he asserts, `is not - as is superficially understood by the common usage of its etymology - a mere political process; a process whereby powers are handed over to the masses . . . But is the generation of a sentiment, and of objective and subjective responses and standards, that collectively lay the foundations upon which democracy, prior to being stated in any constitution, stands in the conscience of the people. The constitution is usually nothing but the formal outcome of the democratic enterprise once transformed into a political reality indicated by a text that is inspired by customs and traditions, and dictated by a sentiment generated in a given circumstance. Such a text will have no meaning if not preceded by the customs and traditions that inspire it, or in other words the historical justifications that necessitate it.' He then warns that the answer to the question `Is there democracy within Islam?' is not necessarily pertinent to a fiqh (jurisprudence) rule deduced from the Sunna or the Qur'an, but is one which is related to the essence of Islam as a whole. `In this sense', he argues, `Islam should be viewed not as a constitution that proclaims the sovereignty of a given community, or that states the rights or liberties of a certain people, but as a democratic enterprise that is the product of an exercise, through which the position of a Muslim vis-a-vis his or her encompassing society is defined, along the path toward accomplishing democratic values and norms provided a Muslim's temporal activity is tied to the general principles endorsed by Islam in the form of a seed sown in the Islamic conscience, and in the form of a general sentiment, and of motives, that constitute the Islamic equilibrium within every member of the community.'
Speaking of models of democracy - `Western' in Europe, `popular' in the East and `new' in China - that differ from one another in the way they express their new symbolic evaluation of man, Bennabi sees that an Islamic model of democracy is attainable. Whereas in the other models the main objective is to endow man with political rights, enjoyed by the `citizen' in Western countries, or social securities, enjoyed by the `comrade' in Eastern countries, `Islam', is distinguishable, according to Bennabi, because it `endows man with a value that surpasses every political or social value'. He explains that the declaration in the Qur'anic verse 70 of Chapter 17, (We have honoured the children of Adam), endows man with more than just rights or securities. `This verse was revealed as if to lay the foundations for a democratic model that is above every other model, where the divine element within man is taken into consideration and not just the human or social aspects as in the other models. Thus, a kind of sanctity is endowed upon man raising his value above whatever value other models give to him.'
- "Democracy in Islamic Political Thought", by Azzam Tamimi,
The full article can be found here:
http://www.ii-pt.com/web/papers/democracy.htm
Citing the French historian Guizot, in his book Europe from the End of the Roman Empire to the French Revolution, Bennabi stressed that various stages of progress led to the emergence of democracy in Europe and to the growth of the democratic sentiment in the European countries. He said: `The great historian explains to us how remote and simple the origins of Western democracy had been before the democratic sentiment slowly formed prior to bursting with the declaration of human rights and citizen rights; the declaration which expressed the new appraisal of man and the legendary and political crowning of the French Revolution. Thus, the European democratic sentiment began to express itself - though not yet ridden of the obscurity that accompanies an object while in the state of making or evolving - through the two grand historical movements, the movement of reform and the movement of renaissance.' Bennabi considers the two movements to be the first expression of the value of the European human in the domain of the soul and in the domain of the mind. He stresses that this is the essence of the Western democratic sentiment when ridden of the fetters of history and politics - since the obscurity is caused by a package composed of phenomena and characteristics peculiar to Western history and which are not found in the history of other races and peoples - and when things are expressed in the terms of psychology and sociology. In other words, the democratic sentiment in Europe was, according to Bennabi, the product and natural outcome of the reform and renaissance movements. `This', he stresses, `is its correct historical meaning, and therefore it cannot simply be severed from the history of Europe so as to be applied to other nations.' However, he reiterates that whether in Europe or anywhere else, the general rule with regard to the nature of the democratic sentiment is that it is the outcome of a specific social continuity. `In psychological terms', he adds, `it is the middle position between two ends that are opposed to each other; the end that expresses the psyche of the oppressed slave on the one hand and the end that expresses the psyche of the oppressive master on the other. The free man, or the new man, in whom the values and conditions of democracy are embodied is the positive co-ordinate that is the sum of two negatives that individually negate all such values and conditions: the negative of servitude and the negative of enslavement.'
As for the question of the existence of democracy within Islam, Bennabi argues that this is dependent on the provision of what he earlier refers to as the general conditions of the democratic sentiment. He then puts forward a set of questions: Does Islam provide and guarantee these objective and subjective conditions, in the sense that it creates a sentiment toward the `ego' and toward the `other' that is compatible with the democratic sentiment? And does it create the appropriate social circumstances for the development of such a sentiment? Does Islam truly reduce the quantity and intensity of the negative motives and of the anti-democratic tendencies that characterize the conduct of the oppressed and the conduct of the oppressor? He suggests that any project aimed at founding a democracy should be considered an educational enterprise for the whole community, administered through the implementation of a comprehensive curriculum that encompasses psychological, ethical, social and political aspects. `Democracy', he asserts, `is not - as is superficially understood by the common usage of its etymology - a mere political process; a process whereby powers are handed over to the masses . . . But is the generation of a sentiment, and of objective and subjective responses and standards, that collectively lay the foundations upon which democracy, prior to being stated in any constitution, stands in the conscience of the people. The constitution is usually nothing but the formal outcome of the democratic enterprise once transformed into a political reality indicated by a text that is inspired by customs and traditions, and dictated by a sentiment generated in a given circumstance. Such a text will have no meaning if not preceded by the customs and traditions that inspire it, or in other words the historical justifications that necessitate it.' He then warns that the answer to the question `Is there democracy within Islam?' is not necessarily pertinent to a fiqh (jurisprudence) rule deduced from the Sunna or the Qur'an, but is one which is related to the essence of Islam as a whole. `In this sense', he argues, `Islam should be viewed not as a constitution that proclaims the sovereignty of a given community, or that states the rights or liberties of a certain people, but as a democratic enterprise that is the product of an exercise, through which the position of a Muslim vis-a-vis his or her encompassing society is defined, along the path toward accomplishing democratic values and norms provided a Muslim's temporal activity is tied to the general principles endorsed by Islam in the form of a seed sown in the Islamic conscience, and in the form of a general sentiment, and of motives, that constitute the Islamic equilibrium within every member of the community.'
Speaking of models of democracy - `Western' in Europe, `popular' in the East and `new' in China - that differ from one another in the way they express their new symbolic evaluation of man, Bennabi sees that an Islamic model of democracy is attainable. Whereas in the other models the main objective is to endow man with political rights, enjoyed by the `citizen' in Western countries, or social securities, enjoyed by the `comrade' in Eastern countries, `Islam', is distinguishable, according to Bennabi, because it `endows man with a value that surpasses every political or social value'. He explains that the declaration in the Qur'anic verse 70 of Chapter 17, (We have honoured the children of Adam), endows man with more than just rights or securities. `This verse was revealed as if to lay the foundations for a democratic model that is above every other model, where the divine element within man is taken into consideration and not just the human or social aspects as in the other models. Thus, a kind of sanctity is endowed upon man raising his value above whatever value other models give to him.'
- "Democracy in Islamic Political Thought", by Azzam Tamimi,
The full article can be found here:
http://www.ii-pt.com/web/papers/democracy.htm
posted by Asim at 8:04 AM
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